

STUART HALL

"RACE, ARTICULATION AND SOCIETIES STRUCTURED IN DOMINANCE" (1980)

"Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance." Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism. Paris: UNESCO, 1980. 305-345.

Drawing on Althusser's conception of the social formation, Hall's goal here is to grasp the precise nature of "racially-structured social formations" (305). Arguing that "attempts to deal with the question of 'race' directly or to analyse those social formations where race is a salient feature constitute, by now, a formidable, immense and varied literature, which it is impossible to summarize at all adequately" (305), Hall contends that it is possible to identify at least "two broad dominant tendencies" (305) in this regard which are thought to be opposed to each other but which may in fact be "inverted mirror images of one another" (305). By stressing the so-called "'neglected element'" (305) found in the other, each approach "points to real weaknesses of conceptualization and indicates, symptomatically, important points of departure for more adequate theorizations" (305). Hall believes that his own approach represents an important "break" (305) or "theoretical rupture" (305) with both these dominant tendencies and offers a "possible restructuring of the theoretical field such as might enable important work of a new kind to begin" (305).

Hall names the two tendencies as the "'economic'" (305) and the "'sociological'" (305). He states that within the former, there exists many different emphases "based on radically different economic premises or frameworks" (306) (e.g. on the "internal economic structures" [306] of specific social formations such as South Africa, or on the "relations between internal and external economic features" [306] often characterized by means of binary oppositions such as developed/underdeveloped, imperialist/colonized, and metropolitan/satellite). What unites all these approaches, however, is the fact that they all take "economic relations and structures to have an overwhelmingly determining effect on the social structures of such formations. Specifically, those social divisions which assume a distinctively racial or ethnic character can be attributed or explained principally with reference to economic structures and processes" (306).

The sociological approach also subsumes a variety of approaches under this heading. Some of these concentrate, for example, on "social relations between different racial or ethnic strata" (306), while others deal with cultural differences (ethnicity) of which race is the primary issue, and yet others are concerned "with forms of political domination or disadvantage, based on the exploitation of racial distinctions" (306). In all such sociologically-oriented studies, the "principal stress . . . is on race or ethnicity as specifically social or cultural features of the social formations under discussion" (306). Despite the differences among these various approaches, under the sociological tendency they "agree on the autonomy, the non-reductiveness, of race and ethnicity as social features. These exhibit . . . their own forms of structuration, have their own specific effects, which cannot be explained away as mere surface forms of appearance of economic relation, nor adequately theorised by reducing them to the economic level of determination" (306).

Each approach sees itself as a necessary corrective to the other. The economic, essentially "mono-causal" (307) approach, believes that it "imparts a hard centre – a materialist basis – to the otherwise soft-centredness or culturalism of ethnic studies" (307). The sociological, "pluralist" (307) in orientation, aims in turn to "introduce a necessary complexity into the simplifying schemas of an economic explanation, and to correct against the tendency of the first towards economic reductionism" (307). From the latter perspective, social formations are "complex ensembles, composed of several

different structures, none of which is reducible to the other" (307). Moreover, each approach has implications of a practical kind for the design and implementation of policies designed to bring about "political transformation" (307). The economic approach stresses that "what is often experienced as ethnic or racial conflicts are really manifestations of deeper, economic contradictions" (307) to which the "politics of political transformations must essentially be addressed" (307). By contrast, if "ethnic relations are not reducible to economic relations, then the former will not necessarily change if and when the latter do. Hence, in a political struggle, the former must be given their due specificity and weight as autonomous factors" (307).

Hall's views is that it is impossible to "explain away race by reference to the economic relations exclusively" (308) though it is true that "racial structures cannot be understood adequately outside the framework of quite specific sets of economic relations" (308). He states, however, that "unless one attributes to race a single, unitary transhistorical character – such that wherever and whenever it appears it always assumes the same autonomous features, which can be theoretically explained, perhaps by some general theory of prejudice in human nature . . . then one must deal with the historical specificity of race in the modern world" (308). For this reason, he concludes that "race relations are directly linked with economic processes: historically, with the epochs of conquest, colonisation and mercantilist domination, and currently with the 'unequal exchanges' which characterise the economic relations between developed metropolitan and 'underdeveloped' satellite economic regions of the world economy" (308). The crucial problem is "not whether economic structures are relevant to racial divisions but how the two are connected" (308).

However, Hall questions whether the economic model, which runs the risk of "economic reductionism" (308) and of commanding "all differences and specificities within the framework of a simplifying economic logic" (308), offer an adequate explanation of the "specificity of those social formations which exhibit distinctive racial or ethnic characteristics" (308)? The problem is how to "account for the appearance of this 'something else' – these extraeconomic factors and their place in the dynamic reproduction of such social formations" (308). The task consequently arises in this connection of coming up with an "adequate theorisation" (308) of this set of "plural explanations" (308).

Hall turns his attention over the course of the next several pages to, firstly, the case of South Africa (pp. 309-317) by comparing the work of Wolpe (who tends to be guilty of economic reductionism) with that of Rex (who may be said to err to the opposite extreme) and, secondly, to the case of Latin America (pp. 317-320) by comparing the competing explanations of Gunder Frank and Ernesto Laclau (who is a Structuralist Marxist deeply influenced by Althusser). These detailed case-studies are designed to illustrate the competing economic and sociological paradigms outlined above and to show how these manifest themselves in the precise theoretical frameworks which inform the work of the respective economists and sociologists/political scientists.

Hall draws an important conclusion from the foregoing discussions: that the "object of inquiry must be treated as a complex articulated structure which is itself 'structured in dominance'" (320). This raises the "emergent theoretical problem of an articulation between different modes of production, structured in some relation of dominance" (320). The problem is how to define a "social formation which, at its economic level, may be composed of several modes of production, 'structured in dominance'" (320-321) and to grasp the "way this articulated combination of modes inserts economic agents drawn from different ethnic groups into sets of economic relations" (321) to form "racially-structured formations" (321). Hall believes that this new set of insights has been made possible by "that immense theoretical revolution constituted by the sophisticated return to the

'reading' of Marx's Capital which has had such a formative impact over the past decade" (321). Hall is alluding here in particular to the publication in 1965 of the seminal Reading Capital (derived from a seminar at the ENS to which both Althusser and his students, including Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, contributed) which would have a profoundly formative effect on others like Nicos Poulantzas and, in the UK, Barry Hindness, Paul Hirst and Hall himself, among others.

The key issue which has been addressed by this group (with fertile implications for the study of race and racism) is the precise nature of the relationship that bind the various component elements which comprise the social formation. There is no question, Hall stresses, of a "necessary correspondence . . . between the structure of modes of production and the specific forms of political domination and ideological legitimation" (322). Rather, Hall believes that the "emergent theory of the 'articulation of different modes of production' begins to deliver certain pertinent theoretical effects for an analysis of racism at the social, political and ideological levels" (322) but not by "deserting the level of analysis of economic relations (i.e. mode of production) but by posing it in its correct, necessarily complex form" (322). This emerging theory, Hall asserts, has the merit of respecting Marx's two most important criteria of Marxist analysis: the 'materialist premise' according to which the "analysis of political and ideological structures must be grounded in their material conditions of existence" (322), and the 'historical premise' that the "specific forms of these relations cannot be deduced, *a priori*, from this level but must be made historically specific 'by supplying those further delineations which explain their *differentiae specificae*'" (322).

To these ends, Hall turns his attention to the meaning of the term 'articulation' which is, Hall points out, a complex term that is the "site of a significant theoretical rupture (coupure) and intervention" (324) on the part of Althusser, et al. He summarises the useful discussion of this term offered by Foster-Carter: it

- is a metaphor used 'to indicate relations of linkage and affectivity between different levels of all sorts of things' . . . [T]hese things need to be linked, because though connected they are not the same. The unity which they form is thus not that of an identity, where one structure perfectly recapitulates or reproduces or even 'expresses' another; or where each is reducible to the other; or where each is defined by the same determinations or have exactly the same conditions of existence; or even where each develops according to the effectivity of the same contradiction (e.g. the 'principal contradiction' so beloved, as the warrant and guarantee of all arguments, by so-called 'orthodox' Marxists). The unity formed by this combination or articulation, is always, necessarily, a 'complex structure': a structure in which things are related, as much through their differences as through their similarities. This requires that the mechanisms which connect dissimilar features must be shown – since no 'necessary correspondence' or expressive homology can be assumed as given. It also means – since the combination is a structure (an articulated combination) and not a random association – that there will be structured relations between its parts, i.e., relations of dominance and subordination. Hence, in Althusser's cryptic phrase, a 'complex unity, structured in dominance.' (325)

Hall then proceeds to summarise over the following pages (pp. 325-331) the Althusseran model of the social formation, presented also in essays like "Contradiction and Overdetermination" and "On the Marxist Dialectic." Althusser's argument bases itself, Hall points out, on essays like the introduction to the so-called Grundrisse (Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy) of 1857-1858 where Marx *seems* to hint, almost in a Structuralist Marxist fashion *avant la lettre*, that society forms something of the order of a

complex unity predicated on a system of differences (see Hall's discussion of this on pp. 329-330 in particular). Hall stresses, too, the influence on Althusser's model of Saussurean linguistics and the Structuralist legacy as this has manifested itself in anthropology and the social sciences more generally.

Hall emphasises Althusser's thoroughgoing anti-Hegelianism, to be precise, his view that Marx did not take over Hegel's notion of society as something of an 'expressive totality' that revolves around a single, all-important, dialectical contradiction. Hall stresses that Althusser grasped, rather, the social formation as a 'complex unity' that is the site of multiple, convergent determinations (what Althusser terms, pace Freud, 'overdetermination'). Hall points out that Althusser and Balibar

conceive of a social formation as composed of a number of instances – each with a degree of 'relative autonomy' from one another – articulated into a contradictory unity. The economic instance or level, itself, is the result of such a 'combination': the articulation of forces and relations of production. In particular social formations, especially in periods of 'transition', social formations themselves may be an 'articulated combination' of different modes with specified, shifting terms of hierarchical ordering between them. (326)

In this scheme of things, the

relations between the economic and the political and ideological forms of their appearance . . . is thought on the analogy of an articulation between structures which do not directly express or mirror each other. Hence, the classical problem for Marxism – the problem of the determinacy of the structure, the 'determination in the last instance by the economic' (which distinguishes Marxism from other forms of social explanation) – is itself redefined as a problem of 'articulation.' What is 'determined' is not the inner form and appearance of each level but the mode of combination and the placing of each instance in an articulated relation to the other elements. (326)

It is this "'articulation of the structure' as the global effect of the structure itself . . . which defines the Althusserian concept of determination: as a structural causality" (326-327).

Allied to this model of society is a very atypical (from the Marxist point of view) philosophy of history, that is, conception of the relationship between "different moments" (326) which comprise the historical development of a social formation. For Althusser, et al., if each social formation is the "result of a variant combination of elements" (327), what "changes, in each epoch, is not the elements, which are invariant (in the definitional sense), but the way they are combined: their articulation" (327). Althusser, et al. are opposed to the notion of history as a "given and necessary sequence of stages, with a necessary progression built into them" (326). They insist, rather, on a "non-teleological reading of Marx, on the notion of 'a discontinuous succession of modes of production' . . . whose combined succession – i.e. articulation through time – requires to be demonstrated" (326). For Althusser, et al., the "scientific analysis of any specific social formation depends on the correct grasping of its principle of articulation: the 'fits' between different instances, different periods and epochs, indeed different periodicities, e.g. times, histories" (326).

Hall's point in all this is to suggest that any social formation is a complex unity in which all the things therein are ultimately irreducible to one of those things (for a traditional Marxist, that would be the economic). There is, rather, a complex relationship (what Althusserians term 'articulation') which binds the component elements to each other. At this point, Hall turns his attention to the work of Gramsci and, particularly, his notion of

hegemony: that "state of 'total social authority' which, at certain specific conjunctures, a specific class alliance wins, by a combination of 'coercion' and 'consent,' over the whole formation, and its dominated classes: not only at the economic level, but also at the level of political and economic leadership" (331). Hall engages in a lengthy discussion of Gramsci (pp. 331-334) ultimately in order to stress the influence of his notion of hegemony in particular on Althusser's notion of ideology in his equally seminal essay of 1969 entitled "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (which Hall discusses on 334-335). For Althusser, given his notion of articulation, ideology is not to be understood as a simple reflection of things economic but, rather, as relatively autonomous thereof. In other words, ideology is linked to the economic facts of a society as much as it is linked to, articulated with, all other component elements, but is not reducible to it. That is, it is similar to in some and different from it in other ways. For this reason, ideology is not a distortion of (economic) reality: both Althusser and Gramsci

maintain that 'ideology' is not a simple form of false consciousness, to be explained as a set of myths or simple false constructions in the head. All societies require specific ideologies, which provide those systems of meaning, concepts, categories, and representations which make sense of the world, and through which men come to 'live' (albeit unconsciously, and through a series of 'misrecognitions'), in an imaginary way, their relation to the real, material conditions of existence (which are only representable to them, as modes of consciousness, in and through ideology). (334)

Far more important than ideology's provenance is its effect, its main function being to ensure the maintenance of the status quo (what Althusser terms the 'reproduction of the social relations of production') by offering images (e.g. of what a man is, or a woman, etc.) with which the members of a society are encouraged to identify. In the course of the process of what he terms 'interpellation,' Althusser argues that "ideologies operate by constituting concrete individuals as the 'social subjects' of ideological discourses" (335).

Having outlined in some detail the Althusseran critique of conventional forms of Marxism, Hall returns at this point to his main goal: to use Marxism rethought in this way in order to "construct a non-reductionist theory of the super-structural or extra-economic aspects of social formations . . . powered through the use of the concept of articulation" (336). Noting that there is as yet "no adequate theory of racism which is capable of dealing with both the economic and the superstructural features of such societies; while at the same time giving a historically-concrete and sociologically-specific account of distinctive racial aspects" (336), Hall states that it is his goal to

document the emergence of a new theoretical paradigm, which takes its fundamental orientation from the problematic of Marx's, but which seeks, by various theoretical means, to overcome certain of the limitations – economism, reductionism, 'a priorism,' a lack of historical specificity – which have beset certain traditional appropriations of Marxism, which still disfigure the contributions to this field by otherwise distinguished writers, and which have left Marxism vulnerable and exposed to effective criticism by many different variants of economic monism and sociological pluralism. (336)

With this in mind, Hall proceeds to offer a "brief outline of some of the theoretical protocols which . . . must govern any such proposed investigation" (336).

Hall, firstly, emphasises the "rigorous application" (336) of the "premise of historical specificity" (336): racism should not be "dealt with as a general feature of human societies" (336), but in terms of "historically specific racisms" (336). One should begin with an "assumption of difference, of specificity rather than of a unitary, trans-historical or universal 'structure'" (336), though this is not to say that there are no

"common features to all those social systems to which one would wish to attribute the designation, 'racially structured'" (336). It is vital, he argues, to "distinguish those social features which fix the different positions of social groups and classes on the basis of racial ascription (biologically or socially defined) from other systems which have a similar social function" (337). He reiterates his warning against "extrapolating a common and universal structure to racism, which remains essentially the same, outside of its specific historical location. It is only as the different racisms are historically specified – in their difference – that they can be properly understood" (337). For this reason, it would be wrong to see disparate racisms as, for example, that which obtains in the Caribbean and that which prevails in the southern USA, or the racism in the same location but at different epochs, as basically "variants of the same thing" (337).

Hall stresses, secondly, that one cannot "explain racism in abstraction from other social relations – even if, alternatively, one cannot explain it by reducing it to those relations" (337). Though it has been claimed that "there are flourishing racisms in pre-capitalist social formations" (337), Hall argues that it is always necessary to "show how thoroughly racism is reorganised and rearticulated" (337) with the emergence of "new modes of production" (337). Hence, for example, his emphasis on the importance of distinguishing between the racism alleged to have accompanied slavery in the ancient world and

racism within plantation slave societies in the mercantilist phase of world capitalist development [which] has a place and function, means and mechanisms of its specific effectivity, which are only superficially explained by translating it out from these specific historical contexts into totally different ones. (337)

By contrast, though slavery in the Ancient World was "articulated through derogatory classifications which distinguished between the enslaved and enslaving peoples" (337), it did not "necessarily entail the use of specifically racial categories, whilst plantation slavery almost everywhere did" (337). Thus, he contends, there can be "no assumed, necessary coincidence between racism and slavery as such" (337): where this "coincidence does in fact appear, the mechanisms and effectivity of its functioning – including its articulation with other relations – need to be demonstrated" (337).

Hall is opposed, in this regard, to a common assumption that "attitudes of racial superiority . . . precipitated the introduction of plantation slavery" (337), arguing that it "might be better to start from the opposite end – by seeing how slavery . . . produced those forms of juridical racism which distinguish the epoch of slavery" (337-338). Doing so would enable one to avoid

explanations which ascribe racism-in-general to some universal functioning of individual psychology – the 'racial itch,' the 'race instinct' – or explain its appearance in terms of a general psychology of prejudice. The question is not whether men in general make perceptual distinctions between groups with different racial or ethnic characteristics, but rather, what are the specific conditions which makes this form of distinction socially pertinent, historically active. What gives this abstract human potentiality its effectivity, as a concrete material force? (338)

Hence, his conclusion: "Appeals to human nature are not explanations, they are an alibi" (338). Hall argues that one must start, rather,

from the concrete historical 'work' which racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions – as a set of economic, political and ideological practices, of a distinctive kind, concretely articulated with other practices in a social formation. These practices ascribe the positioning of different social

groups in relation to one another with respect to the elementary structures of society; they fix and ascribe those positionings in on-going social practices; they legitimate the positions so ascribed. In short, they are practices which secure the hegemony of a dominant group over a series of subordinate ones, in such a way as to dominate the whole social formation in a form favourable to the long-term development of the economic productive base. (338)

Racism is "not present, in the same form or degree, in all capitalist formations: it is not necessary to the concrete functioning of all capitalisms. It needs to be shown how and why racism has been specifically overdetermined by and articulated with certain capitalisms at different stages of their development" (338-339). Moreover, it should not be assumed that it "must take one, single form or follow one necessary path or logic, through a series of necessary stages" (339).

Hall turns his attention, thirdly, to the precise form of the "articulation" (339) of race with the "different structures of the social formation" (339). For example, the "position of the slave in pre-emancipation plantation society" (339) was "not secured exclusively through race" (339) but by the "quite specific and distinctive productive relations of slave-based agriculture" (339), such as the slave's "distinctive property status . . . as a commodity" (339), his "labour power" (229) and the "legal, political and ideological systems which anchored this relation by racial ascription" (339). However, Hall cautions, race should not be reduced to class, as the Trinidadian Marxist Oliver Cromwell Cox risks doing in his important Caste, Class, and Race: a Study in Social Dynamics (1948). Hall stresses that the "combined and uneven relations between class and race are historically more pertinent than their simple correspondence" (339). For this reason, he stresses that race must be given its "distinctive and 'relatively autonomous' effectivity, as a distinctive feature" (339) relative to the other instances or practices which comprise the social formation. What, he asks, are the

different forms and relations in which these racial fractions were combined under capital? Do they stand in significantly different relations to capital? Do they stand within an articulation of different modes of production? What are the relations of dissolution / conservation between them? How has race functioned to preserve and develop these articulations? What are the functions which the dominated modes of production perform in the reproduction of the dominant mode? (339-340)

To this end, he argues, it is important to determine "how different racial and ethnic groups were inserted historically, and the relations which have tended to erode and transform, or to preserve these distinctions through time – not simply as residues and traces of previous modes, but as active structuring principles of the present organisation of society" (339).

Hall summarises at this point the argument which he advances in "Pluralism, Race and Class in Caribbean Society" (1978) that race is irreducible to class, and vice versa. The structures germane to capital "are not simply 'coloured' by race: they work through race" (340). The social

relations of capitalism can be thought of as articulating classes in distinct ways at each of the levels or instance of the social formation – economic, political, ideological. These levels are the 'effects' of the structures of modern capitalist production, with the necessary displacement of relative autonomy operating between them. . . . Race is intrinsic to the manner in which the black labouring classes are complexly constituted at each of these levels. It enters into the way black labour, male and female, is distributed as economic agents at the level of economic practices, and the class

struggles which result from it; and into the way the fractions of the black labouring classes are reconstituted, through the means of political representation . . . as political forces in the 'theatre of politics' – and the political struggles which result; and the manner in which the class is articulated as the collective and individual 'subjects' of emergent ideologies – and the struggles over ideology, culture and consciousness which result. (340-341)

Race is, in short, the "modality in which class is 'lived,' the medium through which class relations are experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and 'fought through'" (342).

Given the complex nature of the relationship between race and class which he has been trying to identify, Hall notes that racism is "not only a problem for blacks who are obliged to suffer it. Nor is it a problem only for those sections of the white working class and those organizations infected by its stain. Nor can it be overcome . . . by a heavy dose of liberal inoculation" (341). Rather, he contends, capital

reproduces the class, including its internal contradictions, as a whole, – structured by race. It dominates the divided class, in part, through those internal divisions which have racism as one of its effects. It contains and disables representative class institutions, by neutralising them – confining them to strategies and struggles which are race-specific, which do not surmount its limits, its barrier. (341)

In short, the "sectional struggles, articulated through race, . . . continue to appear as the necessary defensive strategies of a class divided against itself, face-to-face with capital" (341).

Hall suggests, fourthly, that any such analysis of the racially-inflected nature of the social relations of production would need to be "complemented by an analysis of the specific forms which racism assumes in its ideological functioning" (341), that is, by investigating the "different ways in which racist ideologies have been constructed and made operative under different historical conditions" (341-342). In each case, Hall argues, "in specific social formations, racism as an ideological configuration has been reconstituted by the dominant class relations, and thoroughly reworked" (342). Its precise role in "cementing" (342) a cohesive social whole must be distinguished from that of the other "hegemonic ideologies" (342). Racism, Hall argues, is

particularly powerful and its imprint on popular consciousness especially deep, because in such racial characteristics as colour, ethnic origin, geographical position, etc., racism discovers what other ideologies have to construct: an apparently 'natural' and universal basis in nature itself. (342)

On the basis of this "apparent grounding in biological givens, outside history" (342), racism articulates with other "ideological discourses" (342), not least the "us/them structure of corporate class consciousness" (342), to

dehistoricise – translating historically-specific structures into the timeless language of nature; decomposing classes into individuals and recomposing those disaggregated individuals into the reconstructed unities, the great coherences, of new ideological 'subjects': it translates 'classes' into 'blacks' and 'whites,' economic groups into 'peoples,' solid forces into 'races.' This is the process of constituting new 'historical forces' for ideological discourses, the mechanism . . . of forming new interpellative structures. It produces, as the natural and given 'authors' of a spontaneous form of racial perception, the naturalised 'racial subject.' (342)

This is as true for those who dominate as it is for those who are dominated in a particular society, that is, those "subordinated ethnic groups or 'races' which live their relation to the

real conditions of existence, and to the domination of the dominant classes, in and through the imaginary representations of a racist interpellation, and who come to experience themselves as 'the inferiors,' *les autres*" (342).

Hall concludes by pointing out, however, that racist interpellations "become themselves the sites and stake in the ideological struggle, occupied and redefined to become the elementary forms of an oppositional formation – as where 'white racism' is vigorously contested through the symbolic inversions of 'black power'" (342). For Hall, the

ideologies of racism remain contradictory structures, which can function both as the vehicles for the imposition of dominant ideologies, and as the elementary forms for the cultures of resistance. Any attempt to delineate the politics and ideologies of racism which omit these continuing features of struggle and contradictions win an apparent adequacy of explanation only by operating a disabling reductionism. (342)

Appendix:

Rex, a South African sociologist seems to identify more with the sociological approach. His first essay on the subject "South African society in comparative perspective" illustrates the failure of both structuralist-formalist and Marxist perspectives "to deal effectively with race and ethnicity in South African society" (309). Rex believes in the historical fact of difference. Capitalism was originally "based on the expansion of market relations, production of which is based on 'free labour' (310). However, capitalism in South Africa developed out of conquest of the Bantu peoples and their labour was 'unfree'. This type of capitalism which is different from the one envisioned by Marx, illustrates colonial features, "where conquest and colonization have been central features, and thus pertinent to the appearance, in such societies of 'not simply the class struggle engendered by capitalist development, but the "race war" engendered by colonial conquest..... The racial structure of the South African social formation is thereby given concrete economic conditions of existence – the link traceable, precisely, through its 'peculiarity', its deviation from the classical capitalist path" (310).

Economic relations are therefore fundamental, but not exclusive in the racial structure of the South African social formation. There is also no counter-posing of 'social' against 'economic' factors, and Rex, unlike other culturists, cannot be accused of neglecting the economic relations. However, Hall believes that Rex's theory, although applicable to race, can be strengthened, which he (Hall) attempts near the conclusion of the essay.